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Introduction
The notion of post-mortem privacy increasingly appears to 
be becoming a vital topic of public and scholarly legal con-
cern. Post-mortem privacy is understood here as the right 
of a person to preserve and control what becomes of his 
reputation, dignity, integrity, secrets or memory after death 
(Edwards and Harbinja 2013). In the digital age, the phe-
nomenon of “digital remains” or the digital legacy1 that an 
Internet user leaves behind after his demise, has led to 
novel problems. Not only the detachment of private com-
munications such as e-mails from the physical plane 
(McCallig 2013) but also the intangible nature of digital 
assets such as bank accounts, e-books and iTunes have 
raised intriguing new challenges for laws of inter alia own-
ership (Maimes 2013).2 Laws of ownership will have to 
come to terms with the bare fact that there is no longer a 
physical artefact or manuscript to possess or in which to 
claim ownership.
The locus for the digital presence is no longer circum-
scribed by physical attributes but more by the content of 
1 “Digital remains” is the collective term used to describe the expres-
sions, possessions and impressions that a decedent leaves behind in 
digital media.
2 Before digital doubles, the same questions were posed about pho-
tographs (Warren and Brandeis 1890). The observation of the pho-
tographer of Henry Kissinger, Richard Avedon, is pertinent here. He 
asserted that his photograph was a Doppelgänger, a likeness with his 
own life, an inexact twin whose afterlife may overcome and replace 
the original [underlining mine] (Floridi 2005).
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the information the Internet user provides. Indeed, the digi-
tal persona3 creates, shares and collects content at a stag-
gering rate. As the shift to the digital continues, careful 
stewardship of digital content, which can, in some sense, be 
said to be a rich reflection of you, is more and more neces-
sary (Carroll and Romano 2011). However, when the Inter-
net user wishes to assume the role of a responsible steward, 
he finds Internet providers barring the way. It is curious to 
note these providers pretend to do so exactly for the sake of 
protecting the privacy of their user.4
Some providers even stake a claim of ownership in their 
customers’ e-mail accounts under the guise of this being 
necessary to protect the user’s privacy (Atwater 2006; 
Wilkins 2011).5
The social norms for expressions of bereavement on the 
Internet over the loss of loved ones are still evolving. A 
novel aspect in this development is the persistence of the 
digital persona after the physical demise of the real life per-
son it represented.6 Today’s digital natives7 have begun to 
project their own sensibilities onto rituals and discussions 
3 Cf (Clarke 1994), who defines the digital persona as “a model of 
an individual’s public personality based on data and maintained by 
transactions, and intended for use as a proxy for the individual’’. In 
Clarke’s original definition, the digital persona is then not capable of 
independent action. However, Clarke in 1994 foresaw active digital 
personae and perhaps even autonomous digital personae (which we 
might call software agents or avatars). See also (Roosendaal 2013) 
Bernal sees the online identity “as an ‘extension’ of the offline iden-
tity and personality of the individual concerned” (Bernal 2012).
4 One of the first cases that led to a judicial verdict balancing con-
tractual obligations and privacy interests of decedents, was that 
of U.S. Lance Cpl. Justin M. Ellsworth, who was killed in Iraq on 
November 13, 2004. He had a Yahoo! e-mail account that, according 
to Yahoo!’s policy terminated upon death with all contents therein 
permanently deleted. After his death, Ellsworth’s family requested 
to get access to his messages but Yahoo! denied this, in accordance 
with their policy (Herold 2010). Case drawn from In re Ellsworth, 
No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005). See also (Kopetski).
Google states unequivocally that they are “keenly aware of the trust 
users place in us, and we take our responsibility to protect the pri-
vacy of people who use Google services very seriously”. Accessing 
a Deceased Person’s Mail, GMAIL, http://mail.google.com/support/
bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=14300 (last visited May 4, 2012). 
According to McCallig (McCallig 2013) a recent California case (In 
RE request for order requiring Facebook Inc. to produce documents 
and things), California ND, Case No: C 12-80171 LHK (PSG) con-
firmed that service providers cannot be compelled to provide the con-
tents of a decedent’s online account. Otherwise they would violate the 
Federal Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C. # 2701.
5 But see (Walters 2009).
6 Kasket 2013 proposes to call the digital remains that has the poten-
tial to persist, as facilitated by the digital age, a ‘res digitalis’ or dig-
ital being. It falls somewhere “in the middle of physical being and 
being of mind”.
7 Digital natives are understood as being born after 1980, have access 
to digital technology and have skills to use digital technology in rela-
tively advanced ways.
surrounding death. They are starting blogs, YouTube series 
and Instagram feeds about grief and loss. The conversation 
about bereavement and the deceased is now no longer a pri-
vate affair but it enters a very public forum.8 Most notable 
in this respect is the memorialization feature of Facebook.
Commercial parties also seek to develop services that 
accommodate the assumed needs of this category of Inter-
net users. Services are springing up that address the idea of 
digital immortality through various means like headstone 
QR codes9 that lead to Internet shrines or services that 
allow you to program an avatar10 that is intended to com-
municate on your behalf after your death (Limer 2011). 
Technology in the form of websites, like MyLastWish and 
Heavenote, allows the deceased to connect about their final 
dreams with or to send a final message to their loved ones, 
after they are gone (Maimes 2013). These kinds of websites 
give you some control over what will happen to your repu-
tation, as it emanates from your digital presence after your 
death.
This article will focus on the privacy-related dignitary 
aspects of the Internet user’s digital legacy. It will espe-
cially discuss whether there is such a notion as post-mor-
tem privacy that is worth protecting. The primary issue is 
whether it can be upheld that a legal subject should enjoy 
post-mortem privacy, particularly in relation to personal 
information. Taking the point of view that the control over 
personal information (also known as informational self-
determination)11 is essential in protecting one’s privacy in 
the ante-mortem life (Buitelaar 2012), this article will 
explore whether this principle may have validity in the 
post-mortem context as well. The research question this 
article seeks to answer, is:
Does an appeal to informational self-determination, 
considering its importance for human dignity, justify 
8 Seligson (2014).
9 Research is also being done on gravestone technology that allows 
you to hold a tablet/phone in front of the headstone, which it recog-
nizes and brings you to a memorial website (http://nottinghamtrent.
academia.edu/Philip/Wane).
10 The website ETER9 is a social network (in BETA stage) that relies 
on Artificial Intelligence. One’s Virtual Self creates a Counterpart 
that will interact with the world just like one would if one were pre-
sent. The more one interacts in the network, the more the Counterpart 
will learn. By in this way eternizing, one keeps one’s thoughts and 
posts for all time https://www.eter9.com.
11 The German Constitutional Court traced the right to privacy to 
the fundamental right to the free development of one’s personality. In 
article 2.1 of the German Constitution it says: the value and dignity 
of the person based on free self-determination as a member of a free 
society is the focal point of the order established by the Basic Law. 
The general personality right as laid down in Arts 2 (1) i.c.w. I(1) GG 
serves to protect these values (…).
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that individuals exercise control over their personal 
data after death?
Although this question might be approached through an 
argument based on claims of living persons to respect their 
post-mortem dignity, this could only provide a limited form 
of protection, as it would be restricted to honoring ante-
mortem expectations. The aim of this article is to present a 
more fundamental, forward-looking theoretical argument 
that may be able to provide a more comprehensive form of 
protection for the various forms of post-mortem presence 
that are likely to subsist in the future. It appears that the 
often-held straightforward assumption that the decuius 
does not qualify for privacy rights, because his bodily pres-
ence has been terminated, requires reconsideration. The 
article therefore spends much time on the problem of the 
subject, which does not seem to be functioning in the case 
of the absence of a living subject. By approaching the ques-
tion from a more philosophical point of view (Mill’s con-
cept of liberty and Dworkin’s concept of life-transcending 
integrity) an attempt is made to show that the objective 
rights, such as enshrined in the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), cannot be limited to the rights of 
living human beings but persist in vicarious digital perso-
nae. To further underpin the argument, various other lines 
of argument are developed such as respect for the dead by 
way of being true to promises, respect for the reputation of 
the persisting public persona and the composition of your 
identity in narrative form which also persists after your 
death. Brief reference is finally made to recent develop-
ments in the legal and philosophical sphere, where the legal 
system increasingly is taking note of personae that have no 
bodily presence or are, at least, non-human12. The article 
suggests it may be promising to build on these construals a 
conception of post-mortem privacy. If this hypothesis 
holds, the digital remains of individuals subsisting in the 
form of digital personae would then be granted a kind of 
privacy in the sense that they should be allowed to control 
‘their’ personal data, constituted by data flows created in 
their ante-mortem and in a limited sense, their post-mortem 
phases.
Background
Social networks are increasingly places where millions of 
users reveal a lot about the most intimate details of their 
12 In this article no attention will be paid to the rights of the nascitu-
rus even though many similarities can be discerned. Main reason to 
disregard the nasciturus is that he has no previous existence (Rom-
bach 1963).
lives. These details cover all aspects of life, but due to the 
fact that the average social network user was at first mostly 
of a relatively young age, death was not a particular con-
cern for the participants. Users relatively seldom died. The 
social network sites accordingly did not really worry about 
the ramifications that follow the death of a user. In recent 
years, however, the problem has become more urgent 
because more and more people over 65 are signing up 
(Wortham 2010)13 and by definition this age group has a 
shorter life expectancy than the so-called digital natives. 
Facebook14 apparently wishes to accommodate its users 
also in this phase of their existence as Facebook client by 
providing for pages where they permit their bereaved to 
share their mourning process with other bereaved, the so-
called memorial pages. However, it is not always clear for 
the average Facebook user what steps they have to take to 
have Facebook handle their profile after their demise 
according to their personal preferences.15
The very personal nature of the information that users 
entrust to the various Internet platforms such as social net-
work sites (e.g. Facebook and LinkedIn), gaming (World of 
Warcraft) and communication (e-mail, Twitter) poses a 
13 This happens at a rate of about 6  million per month (at least in 
2009). In Great Britain, the increase was one million in a year (2009) 
(Wallop and Roberts 2010). In 2014, recent data from the Office of 
National Statistics showed that internet use more than tripled for 
those 65 and older between 2006 and 2013.
14 When someone dies and Facebook is informed, the profile is 
“memorialized”. No one can access it or change it, although those 
on the friends list can continue to view and interact with the profile 
as before, posting material on the Timeline or sending messages to 
the deceased. In February 2015, Facebook extended its rather strict 
memorialization feature by introducing (only in the US) a so-called 
legacy contact. The memorialized account is, in fact, turned into 
a more active entity because, to a very limited extent, this account 
manager (a friend or family member, selected by the Facebook user) 
can manage the account after its owner’s decease. The legacy contact 
will be able to write a post at the top of the memorialized Timeline, 
announcing the memorial service, respond to new friend requests 
who were not yet connected on Facebook, update the profile picture 
and cover photo, download an archive of the photos, posts and pro-
file information (Callison-Burch et  al. 2015).Other interactive web-
sites have a variety of policies (Mazzone 2012). Twitter, for example, 
promises to close the account of a deceased user and provide family 
members with an archive of the user’s public Tweets. LinkedIn sim-
ply closes a deceased member’s profile after receiving a “Verification 
of Death” form. Google knows an Inactive Account Manager that 
waits a certain period before sending a mail if the user remains inac-
tive. If no response ensues, Google notifies a ‘trusted contact’ (James 
and Magee 2013).
15 Facebook approaches the death of a profile user as a way of tidy-
ing up inactive and redundant accounts. To a large extent, Facebook 
depends on the report of other users that a user has passed away. 
Facebook also uses a scanning approach of posts using terms like 
Rest In Peace but this is open to pranks. There is no section to correct 
the consequences of the pranks which sometimes lead to embarrass-
ing and painful consequences.
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challenge to, and raises questions about, traditional experi-
ences and concepts of privacy and how we regulate it. 
Facebook, for example, allows users to grant access to their 
profile to a chosen few while others offer even the intimate 
details of their personal lives to the general public (Kasket 
2013).16 Ever since Goffman (Goffman 1959), the socio-
logical theory of role-playing has shown that everyone con-
sciously or unconsciously is adopting behaviors that are 
designed to control others’ levels of access to ourselves and 
to information about us. On social network sites such as 
Facebook, one attempts to take care of one’s privacy by a 
constant dialectic between openness and concealing, 
depending on the context. Nissenbaum outlined a privacy 
framework of expected information flows, called contextual 
integrity. When the flow of information runs along the lines 
of established norms within a specific context, no uneasy 
feeling of a privacy infringement occurs. When the flow of 
information does not meet the contextual expectations, 
however, a violation has occurred and contextual integrity 
has not been maintained (Nissenbaum 2010). This violation 
is also often construed as an inappropriate transfer of per-
sonal data across boundaries of what we think of as sepa-
rate spheres of access (Ambrose 2013). Contrary to the 
general opinion that Facebook means the end of privacy, it 
may well be argued that Facebook, with its evolving pri-
vacy policies, permits the user to pay much more attention 
to regulatory processes to safeguard his privacy than was 
the case in the analogue age. If the user takes the time to 
exercise these regulatory possibilities, he in a sense asserts 
control over transfers of personal data between spheres.17 
Privacy theorists call this the principle of informational 
self-determination [see (Buitelaar 2012) with references 
and a discussion of this concept].
When the user of the Facebook profile has died, the 
question may well be posed if privacy considerations for 
our digital selves still play a role. Most importantly, the 
Internet user is no longer actively able to make decisions 
about access to the digital storehouses of personal 
16 For the methods Facebook users employ to control the information 
available about them, Kasket (Kasket 2013) uses the term “privacy 
regulation” within a psychological framework. It refers then to behav-
ior that is designed to control access to the self.
17 A caveat is in place because the staggering number of users 
of Facebook seems to make it impossible for the individual user to 
determine precisely in which context the information about him is 
used. In fact, it is better to speak of a presentation of self in relation 
to the generalized other. Just as in the ante-mortem situation, how-
ever, a whole range of regulatory instruments and legal institutions 
are potentially suitable to protect post-mortem privacy, e.g. laws of 
privacy, breach of confidence, intellectual property, personality, pub-
licity, defamation, succession, executory and trusts and data protec-
tion. It may be argued that thus the user is given the opportunity to 
exercise control over his presentation. I will return to this later.
information he has left behind. Still, Facebook profiles in 
most cases persist. Facebook’s memorialization policy can 
be said to repurpose these profiles after death as a site of 
mourning, memorialization and continued communication 
with the deceased (Kasket 2013). Besides challenges to the 
management of the privacy of these self-representations, a 
whole new set of questions in the area of ethics, psychol-
ogy, cybernetics and law arises. It is evident that, for one, 
the deceased no longer is in a position to exercise human 
autonomy as an active agent in the traditional, legal sense. 
In light of the overwhelming presence of deceased human 
beings18 and digital doubles on the Internet, it seems worth-
while to reconsider the implementation of the notion of 
human autonomy with regard to these digital representa-
tions of the self. This is especially so because many experi-
ence the vicarious version of their digital double as being 
almost a better representation of their selves.19 Some theo-
rists hypothesize that in the Internet era, this entity, created 
and facilitated by the digital age,—“a being that falls some-
where in the middle of physical being and being of 
mind”—(Kasket 2013)20 persists after the death of the 
Facebook user. It will be a challenge for existing legal 
frameworks to accommodate these entities in a way that 
will safeguard their privacy in a manner that is executable 
and sensible in the Internet era.
Problem of the subject
Considering that the crucial problem with recognizing 
a right to privacy in the case of a deceased person is the 
lack of an active agent, it is pertinent to briefly discuss here 
what has been called the ‘problem of the subject’ as it per-
tains to the post-mortem phase of a person.
By the problem of the subject, I mean the implausibility 
of interests persisting in the absence of an interested sub-
ject.21 It may well be argued that, when a person’s public 
persona in the sense of his reputation, is falsely blackened 
after his death, the ante-mortem person is also defamed. 
Assuming that a person’s immaterial interests may survive 
his death, and that by death or other subsequent events 
18 As far as Facebook profiles are concerned, it was estimated that in 
2012 there were at least 30 million profiles relating to dead people on 
the Internet (Eler 2012).
19 Online identities are to many at least as much themselves as their 
offscreen selves (Schechtman 2012). It is often asserted that in the 
Internet era, you are your information (Floridi 2005).
20 Kasket notes that J. Kim in “phenomenology of Digital-being” 
(2001) 24 Human Studies, 87–11 at p. 87 has proposed the term “res 
digitalis” or digital being.
21 In this section I draw on (Feinberg 1987).
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these interests are not fulfilled or defeated, one may very 
well regard the ante-mortem person as harmed (Feinberg 
1987). In other words, the interests that survive the person 
in question are harmed by thwarting or nonfulfillment even 
if the person does not suffer subjective disappointment. If 
this is so, the subsisting subject may be conceived of as a 
moral actor. However, this still does not permit attributing 
rights to the deceased but subsisting subject in the sense 
that it would bestow him with legal agent status. Indeed, 
rights are a particularly agent-oriented mode of moral dis-
course. Rights, on the other hand, do not exhaust moral rea-
soning (Winter 2010).
Feinberg has argued that postmortem persons cannot be 
harmed, for a moldering corpse has no feeling. He, how-
ever, builds an argument that posthumous harms can retro-
actively harm the interests of ante-mortem persons. Take 
for example the unfortunate event that the life-insurance 
company, where the deceased had protected the interests of 
his loved ones, collapses 5  min after that person’s death, 
then his ante-mortem interest in his loved ones’ security is 
harmed. In other words, it can be argued that knowledge is 
not a necessary condition of harm before one’s death. In the 
case of the collapsing life-insurance company, it can at the 
least be argued that this person himself in his ante-mortem 
stage is misfortunate because his interests will be thwarted. 
Feinberg argues that what was true all along has now 
become apparent.22 Moreover, this raises the question if the 
situation really changes as to the precondition of being 
aware of an interest being harmed before or after death. It 
may well be stated then that the objection that dead men 
are permanently unconscious and that therefore they cannot 
be aware of events as they occur, and that they therefore do 
not have a stake one way or the other in such events, does 
not hold.
The pivotal question with the ‘problem of the subject’, 
both in moral and in juridical terms, remains whether the 
individual dead can present practical or moral reasons or 
interests on which claims can be grounded. Besides inter-
ests that are squelched the moment the subject dies, the 
dead person’s surviving interests must be the interests of 
someone or other who has a stake in them. How could a 
moldering corpse have a stake in these interests, it is often 
objected. Even so, there are many interests of living per-
sons that can be violated without their ever becoming aware 
of it. Arguably, it is a plausible analogy that, since knowl-
edge is not a necessary condition for harm in the ante-
mortem stage, it is not a necessary condition either in the 
post-mortem stage. Feinberg posits convincingly that the 
interest one has in a good reputation is the best example of 
22 J. Feinberg, Harm to Others, (Vol. 1), (Oxford University Press, 
1984) as cited in (Winter 2010).
the self-regarding category also when one is no longer in a 
position to be injured, wronged or harmed by it. Obviously, 
self-centered interests provide the highest degree of fulfill-
ment, satisfaction and pleasure when one is able to achieve 
them in his life-time and that they are brought about by 
us, or if not by us, then for us. In case these interests are 
thwarted or even made senseless after one’s death by the 
occurrence of harmful posthumous events, it can be said 
that this event is responsible for harming the ante-mortem 
person. However, this should be interpreted as entailing 
no more than that the ante-mortem person was harmed in 
being the subject of interests that were going to be defeated 
whether he knew it or not. My friends may then very well 
feel sorry for my descendants but also for me, even though 
I am dead. In this line of reasoning, it may be upheld that 
the harm principle also encompasses the retroactive harm 
that not only an ante-mortem person suffers by events that 
occur after his demise but also by vicarious or posthumous 
events that harm his persisting digital double even though 
he has no knowledge of it.
Applying the harm principle to the digital persona 
surviving the physical person’s cessation, it is helpful 
to expand the argument by understanding the definition 
of personality to include not only our abilities to believe, 
learn, feel and so on but also the characteristics of a public 
persona, who subsists in speech, memory of living persons 
as well as in information held in impersonal media (Win-
ter 2010). In a sense, the theory of the public persona that 
survives the cessation of the physical person may be said 
to lend support to the theory that a phenomenon such as 
posthumous claims are not inconceivable because from the 
above it may be deduced that there is a complex posthu-
mous persona available to bear claim-ascription (Winter 
2010). On the other hand, Winter also recognizes that a 
public persona that persists in media and memory differs 
little from a fictional character. It is hard to believe that a 
fictional character can present us with a moral claim.
Yet again, a moral-legal argument may be made for the 
plausibility of posthumous claims by referring to the thesis 
that the blocking of a person’s interests contravenes the 
obligatory respect for a person’s end-setting interests. A 
person’s interests have a goal that lies in the future and as 
argued, quite often, extend beyond his physical presence. 
Obviously, interests will only exist if there is an interested 
subject, who is an entity that is able to make reflexive value 
judgment. There must be a close connection between 
“being interested” and “having interest”. One can only have 
the latter if one has the capacity for the former (Winter 
2010). Moreover, moral claimants such as human agents 
are special in contrast to non-interested things or even 
‘agents’ like computers, because the entity must be the sort 
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of thing to which things can matter, i.e. that something 
could be of interest to the entity in question.23 Indeed, 
things that matter to humans may lead to moral claims. In 
turn, these are necessary to interests upon which claims are 
grounded. These claims must, however, be of significance 
to the claimant. Because, during my life, the various 
aspects of my personhood form a more or less cohesive 
whole, the status of my reputation (my public persona) 
matters to me regardless of what I know concerning possi-
ble changes to it (the so-called no-effect injury) (Winter 
2010).
In contrast to Feinberg, Winter does not believe that no-
effect injuries provide a sufficient ground for the analogy 
to base posthumous claims on (Winter 2010). Posthumous 
defamation is still wrong, not only on legal grounds but 
more so on moral grounds. Swennen argues that general 
notions of the protection of human dignity in this context 
might be said to transcend the interests of a random legal 
subject (Swennen 2013). Winter’s discourse leads then to 
the conclusion that it can be doubted whether an ante-mor-
tem person’s post-mortem fortune can ground posthumous 
claims. Winter quite convincingly states that the original 
problem is merely reposed by attempting to infer from 
the non-necessary character of experience (the no-effect 
injury) the non-necessary character of an interested subject 
(Winter 2010).
Personality rights—is there a ground for their 
post-mortem persistence?
Personality rights
“Person” can refer to a sort of entity that is subject of moral 
predicates such as “right” and “duty”, but it can also refer 
to the unity imposed on a diversity of mental elements, 
such as memories, loyalties, preferences and opinions. A 
person’s physical, mental and moral identity is protected by 
the rights he holds as a juridical person and legal subject 
(Swennen 2013). This can be done in the form of a negative 
protective right or of a positive right, both in its horizontal 
and vertical dimension. The juridical person holds sover-
eignty over a spatial zone which is determined by his body. 
The discretionary competence over this spatial zone can be 
construed from a broader perspective in the sense that it is 
essential for a person’s personal autonomy to determine by 
his own choice what enters his experience. From a rights 
theory point of view, the right to privacy can then be seen 
23 Winter refers to C. Taylor, “The concept of a person” in Human 
Agency and Language; Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge Press, 1985) p. 98.
as a subjective right as well as an objective right.24 Rules of 
objective right line out which attributes and goods consti-
tute a person’s unique identity. These can be both material 
as well as immaterial. Privacy as a subjective right shows 
that only the individual concerned holds the active right to 
decide who can interfere with his inviolable personality. 
Privacy as an objective right denotes an individual’s inal-
ienable interest in worthwhile elements of his personality, 
the inviolability of his own space in which to develop and 
flourish. It is asserted here that the right to privacy is, in 
fact, a mix of these two types of rights.
Post-mortem persistence of personality rights
In the English common law system, there is a long recog-
nized principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona: 
personal causes of actions die with the person, such as def-
amation claims (Harbinja 2013). This pertains to especially 
moral rights of authors. Countries with a civil-law tradition 
appear to be more inclined to recognize the persistence of 
similar rights after death (Harbinja 2013). This is promi-
nently so in Germany where the Grundgesetz (GG) is most 
outspoken in the defense of the inviolability of human dig-
nity. In Germany, the protection of human dignity derives 
from its highest constitutional source, the German Consti-
tutional Law. This has been applied to the protection of the 
dignity of the deceased. In the Mephisto case, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that “[i]t would be inconsist-
ent with the constitutional mandate of the inviolability of 
human dignity, which underlies all basic rights, if a person 
could be belittled and denigrated after his death. Accord-
ingly an individual’s death does not put an end to the state’s 
duty under Art 1.1 GG to protect him from assaults on his 
human dignity” (BVerfG 30, 173).
Laws of testation, on the other hand, relate only to what 
happens to the assets with economic value someone leaves 
behind after his death. These assets are then attached to the 
inheritor who, in this sense, continues the personality rights 
of the decuius.25 In so far as personality rights such as the 
24 European Continental writers distinguish between subjective 
and objective rights (Campbell 2013). Subjective rights are primar-
ily focused on the rights of individuals, conceived of as political and 
economic claims but also as liberties, faculties or powers. Natural 
law developed over the centuries into objective rights, a conception 
of the attributes that make the individual person unique, “a force of 
the soul” associated with human rationality. (B. Tierney, The Idea of 
Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church 
Law, 11-50-1625. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1997) as cited in 
(Pennington 1998).
25 This is also called the principle of saisine: le mort saisit le vif 
which means that the deceased is continued in the person of the 
inheritor (Hartkamp 2013).
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right to publicity can be expressed in economic terms, 
these can be inherited by the inheritors (Swennen 2013). 
On the other hand, it can be asserted that the subjective 
rights and duties attached to the person of the decuius are 
not transferred. This is only logical because a personal, 
subjective right is exercised in relation to one or more per-
sons. When that natural person dies, an important part of 
the personal right is extinguished. In this strict juridical 
interpretation, laws of testation do not shed any light on the 
question of who inherits the persistence of the non-eco-
nomic, digital elements of the deceased’s physical, psychic 
and moral personality as represented in the vicarious digi-
tal double of his ante-mortem self. They appear to die with 
the demise of the living holder of the personality rights.
However, as noted, the overwhelming persistence of dig-
ital personae on the Internet, without there being a living 
counterpart who can actively control the subjective rights 
associated with this persona, calls for somehow accommo-
dating post-mortem digital personae with an appropriate 
locus in the legal framework that governs the survival or 
extinction of the rights and duties of subjects. In the con-
text of the research question, the following, concomitant 
question becomes relevant: how can the issue of protecting 
the informational privacy of the digital double that subsists 
post-mortem be given a normative basis beyond purely 
economic terms, which at present is the predominant con-
cern of laws of testation?
Human dignity
A promising approach is to take account of the opinions 
contained in German doctrine on the natural right of human 
dignity. As noted, the German Grundgesetz considers it 
only logical that the absolute protection of the inviolability 
of human dignity that a human being enjoys during his life-
time, persists after his demise. Immanuel Kant has stated in 
this respect, that everyone is entitled to adopt the defense of 
the bona fama defuncti of a decuius and that this should be 
regarded as part of the Recht der Menschheit.26 Kant under-
scores, in other words, that at least the reputation of the 
deceased belongs to the innumerable moral judgements 
that enjoy nearly universal agreement (Mulder 2015). 
Later, I will return to the view of the digital representation 
of the deceased as, in fact, being comparable to the public 
persona the living person presents on the Internet. Indeed, 
the protection of the roles the digital person plays on the 
Internet, is considered by many theorists (Marmor 2015) 
today to be the protection of the right to privacy. As such, 
privacy can be regarded as a social good and not merely as 
an individual right (Regan 2015).
26 I. Kant. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Das Privatrecht. # 35.
Furthermore, the question may be posed whether the 
concept of informational self-determination, as it provides 
a conceptual basis for protecting the privacy of natural per-
sons in their ante-mortem phase, can be transposed to the 
post-mortem phase of these natural persons, in order to 
serve as a starting point for the quest for a legal framework 
that takes proper cognizance of the persisting digital pres-
ence of the decuius.27 In the current legal framework, the 
European Court of Human Rights has refused to recognize 
the right of privacy for the deceased, unless their privacy is 
connected to the privacy of living individuals.28 Neverthe-
less, the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 
(1981) does not mention natural persons when it reflects on 
the protection of privacy but rather covers “personal data” 
as being any information relating to an identified or identi-
fiable individual (data subject); indeed, deceased as data 
subjects are not by definition excluded (McCallig 2014). 
This conception would then be in line with the general and 
sometimes deeply felt innate need to grant the deceased 
some form of legal protection. This pertains not only to the 
deceased’s bodily component (the corpse) but also to his 
digital remains (Swennen 2013). Approaching the issue in 
this manner, i.e. from the human rights perspective, presup-
poses a general interest. As such, the natural human right of 
dignity component of personality rights might provide a 
worthwhile starting point for providing the building blocks 
for the hypothesis that there could be such a thing as post-
mortem privacy in the sense of informational 
self-determination.
To show that this exercise is not a priori doomed to fail, 
it is illuminating to take a better look at some jurisprudence 
where surprisingly some unexpected opinions on the dig-
nity of deceased persons are expressed. The seemingly 
undisputed argument that the deceased are by nature unable 
to hold and exercise personality right turns out to have been 
questioned by reputable jurists. The dissenting opinion of 
27 In the European Union, twelve states recognise deceased as enti-
tled to independent rights (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Slove-
nia and Spain). Four states expressly exclude the deceased (Cyprus, 
Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Ten states require there 
to be a need of a connection with a natural person (Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Italy (both natural and legal person), Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain). One state puts a tem-
poral limit on this recognition (Estonia, namely 30 years on consent) 
(McCallig 2014).
28 Jäggi v Switzerland, no. 58,757/00, ECHR 2006-X, Estate of 
Kresten Fittenborg Mortensen v Denmark (dec.), no. 1338/03, ECHR 
2006-V. See also: (Case of Putistin v. Ukraine 2013) or in the case 




the ECHR judge Fura-Sandstrom in the Akpinar-Altun v 
Turkey case is quite revealing.29 The judge states unequivo-
cally that the State’s responsibility to respect an individu-
al’s dignity and to protect bodily integrity “cannot be 
deemed to end with the death of the individual in ques-
tion”.30 Judge Fura-Sandstrom argues from the Kantian 
principles that, just as in the Mephisto case, human beings 
must always be treated as ends and not solely as means. She 
finds this a compelling ethical principle to apply to Article 
3 of the Convention. Indeed, from a textual point of view 
she can support her case further because Article 3 does not 
put any restrictions, qualification or exceptions to the blank 
statement that no person shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman degrading treatment or punishment.
Autonomy
To elaborate on the philosophical basis for the subjective/
objective rights approach to the search for an answer 
whether informational self-determination as grounded in 
the human right to dignity may play a role in safeguarding 
the privacy of the deceased, a discussion of Mill’s concept 
of liberty is appealing and apposite at this point. John Stu-
art Mill was, I believe, the first to draw the distinction 
between self- and other-regarding decisions, which pro-
vides a useful guide for mapping the boundaries of per-
sonal autonomy. Mill states unequivocally that one of the 
elements of personal autonomy is the right to determine by 
one’s own choice what enters one’s experience.31 This is 
one of the various things that is meant by “my right to pri-
vacy” (Feinberg 1983). Regan (Regan 2015) underscores 
that the Millian view on privacy regards this institution as 
important for the development of a type of individual that 
forms the basis for the contours of society that we share in 
common.
In addition, Mill argues that discretionary control of 
body, privacy and landed property together do not exhaust 
a plausible conception of personal autonomy. The kernel of 
the idea of autonomy is the right to make choices and deci-
sions—what to put into my body, where and how to move 
my body through public space, how to use my chattels and 
physical property, what personal information to disclose to 
others, what information to conceal and more (Feinberg 
29 It concerns a case of a presumed Turkish terrorist who is killed by 
Turkish soldiers in 2007. After his death, his corpse was mutilated by 
the soldiers by cutting off his ear. He was returned in this state to his 
family. The ECHR, however, has not accepted the case as yet (Akpi-
nar and Altun v Turkey 2007).
30 Reference is made to the German Constitution and the Mephisto 
Case.
31 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956). This work was 
originally published in 1859.
1983). Feinberg tries to explain this concept of sovereignty 
or autonomy in terms of personal domains that are analo-
gous to the territory of a politically sovereign state (Fein-
berg 1983). This allows him to transpose this analogy from 
the spatial dimension or boundary of a state to that of the 
individual’s body’s ‘breathing space’ around one’s body, 
comparable to offshore fishing rights in the national model. 
This breathing space concept extends the territorial sover-
eignty concept to a sovereign self-rule sphere and submits 
it as a tool for moral judgments. It can be said that Mill 
takes the right of self-determination to the extreme by argu-
ing that it is entirely underivative, as morally basic as the 
good of self-fulfillment itself.32
In order to demarcate the personal domain in moral 
terms, it is now useful to refer to Mill’s principle of self-
regarding and other-regarding decisions. Self-regarding 
decisions are decisions that primarily and directly only 
affect the interests of the decision-maker. Outside the per-
sonal domain are those decisions that are other-regarding 
decisions that directly and in first instance affect the inter-
ests of other persons. In moral terms, these self-regarding 
interests deal with vital aspects such as decisions about 
procreation. More importantly, perhaps, the individual 
should be in a position to enforce his right to self-deter-
mination so as to achieve his good of self-fulfillment. The 
subsequent question is, whether this conception of personal 
sovereignty not only marks ‘spatial’ and topical boundaries 
of the personal domain but also provides for shifting ‘tem-
poral’ boundaries as well.
To illustrate the possibility of personal sovereignty not 
being limited by temporal boundaries, the following exam-
ple is helpful. This is the case of the reformed murderer on 
Death Row (Feinberg 1983). Feinberg mentions the case of 
a convicted murderer who, after 7 years, had acquired an 
education, achieved genuine repentance, and even recon-
structed his personality and character. He might well be 
described as “not the same person” as the murderer. Still, 
even he requires some sense of continuity with the past of 
and self-identity of an earlier wrongdoer.
This example is to be interpreted in the light of the just 
discussed Millian concept of self-regarding decisions, 
which an individual ought to be able to take as an autono-
mous person. However, these decisions are inextricably 
mixed with other-regarding decisions. They put an obliga-
tion on other persons to carry out the wishes made freely 
at an earlier time even if the promisor retracts them later. 
Indeed, it can be argued that it is within the realm of the 
principle of personal autonomy that moral obligations or 
32 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) as cited in (Fein-
berg 1983).
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promises made in the ante-mortem phase should remain in 
force after the death of the promisor. Notwithstanding the 
complexity of weighing the prevalence of self-regarding 
versus other-regarding decisions as well as different types 
of moral reasons such as obligations or fidelity, the prin-
ciple of personal autonomy does provide a clear guiding 
principle. It would be evading responsibility for what one 
is doing to permit one to say that the later self is not the 
same self as the earlier self who made the original promise. 
Likewise, an autonomous person cannot evade his respon-
sibility either by arguing that he should not be governed by 
the dead hand of an earlier self. This is an illustration of the 
returning ‘problem of the subject’.
Informational self-determination
At this point, I tender the suggestion to consider the two 
concepts of dignity and autonomy, as described, as together 
constituting the foundation of the concept of privacy 
(Buitelaar 2012). The legal concept of informational self-
determination was developed by the German courts in the 
1990s. The German Constitutional Court referring to the 
German Grundgesetz (Art 1, 2) established a direct link 
between the data protection regime and two basic values 
enshrined in the Constitution (Rouvroy and Poullet 2009). 
These are the constitutional rights to the right to respect 
and protection of one’s dignity and the right to self-devel-
opment. The concept of privacy, made up of these funda-
mental elements, can thus be positioned meaningfully in 
the ethical and philosophical discourse. The two constitu-
tive concepts of dignity and autonomy, underlying privacy, 
permit modern man to pursue ideals of life and character, 
both before and after his demise, which would be difficult 
to achieve were privacy not safeguarded. Autonomy and 
dignity permit a person to see himself as a person with infi-
nite, indeterminate possibilities. In this line of thinking, I 
follow Benn’s argument that, if the individual has the con-
fidence that he can be himself, he can believe in himself 
as a person (Benn 1984). A person in this sense is a sub-
ject with a consciousness of himself as agent, as a chooser 
and as one attempting to steer his own course through the 
world. The concept of informational self-determination 
can in that light be understood as the capacity to determine 
without coercion which information about him is and will 
be available and accessible.
Life-transcending integrity and informational 
self-determination
The question may be posed how this combination of auton-
omy and dignity into the concept of informational self-
determination may help understand how the deceased may 
be positioned in such a way that he can control the informa-
tion that is contained in the persisting digital double.
Dworkin (1993) distinguishes two types of wrongs, the 
transgression of either detached or derivative values. He 
argues that derivative values, like rights including claims, 
are distinctive in arising from our interests. In the case of 
harming a person by raping him, from a dignitary perspec-
tive, it may be argued that a person has an interest in bod-
ily integrity and this forms the basis for his derivative right 
not to be raped. People, in addition however, also embody 
the detached value of ‘sexual dignity’. Different people 
express and respect this value in different ways. Persons 
interpret this detached value as applicable in broad or more 
limited confines. According to Winter, although everyone 
has a right not to be raped, based on the detached value 
of ‘sexual dignity’, no one has a claim to obligate another 
with regards to their sexual expression. Nevertheless, start-
ing from the dignitary approach of respect, based on the 
derivative as well as the detached values, every person may 
derive moral reasons but also derivative rights to have his 
integrity respected even if he is no longer able to arbitrate 
his own agency. This is, for example, the case with vegeta-
tive persons but also deceased persons. According to Dwor-
kin, these claims are based on an obligatory respect for the 
interests expressed by a person’s life before his demise by 
death or otherwise. This is what Dworkin terms life-tran-
scending integrity.
Feinberg asserted that people’s lives are more success-
ful if the interests they formed while alive, flourish when 
they are dead (Feinberg 1987). As noted, Dworkin embeds 
his attribution of posthumous interests in his theory of the 
integrity of life. Dead people hold claims that are grounded 
in an obligatory respect for the interests expressed during a 
person’s life before it ends (Dworkin 1993). Many people 
find their most important interests in “life-time transcend-
ing interests” and they put much value on becoming known 
through these projects. Once undertaken, these projects 
can become part of these persons and, in fact, they provide 
them with a unique identity.
Before the ascent of social network profiles, the percep-
tions of the experiences an individual has of his self-iden-
tity are bound into a unity by the narrative approach. These 
perceptions can be seen as bits or streams of information 
that an individual agent endowed with informational skills 
may use to attribute a unified self-identity to himself, at 
least in his self-conception. It is, of course, a serious chal-
lenge to explain how all the bits of information that com-
pose a self are held together if there is no narrator to keep 
these disjointed bits of information together. Only presup-
posing a narrator would solve the problem, but this cannot 
be because the narrative theory of the self describes the 
narrator as the narrative (Floridi 2011). Kant, on the other 
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hand, has argued that the unified coherence of the informa-
tional bits could only be guaranteed by the unity of the very 
agent’s self. These normative, informational activities thus 
permit a self-governing individual to constitute himself as a 
person and articulate his lifestories continuously and 
implicitly in ongoing autobiographical narratives, thereby 
ensuring the posthumous and proper persistence of their 
life’s work (Buitelaar 2014).33
An example of this is the Companions project (Wilks 
2015). In this project a conversational agent was developed 
designed to interact with a person for a long time, learning 
their tastes and habits. In the process, the agent builds up 
a narrative picture of a person’s life for posterity. The pro-
gram not only manages the autobiographical material of the 
creator to leave some form of self-presentation of that per-
son’s life but also permits communication with descendants 
by assuming the voice and screen image of the deceased 
owner. Descendants can interact with the program and 
receive information about the deceased person in the way 
he intended to be remembered.
For a self-governing individual as composed of a unified 
coherence of informational bits, to assert legal and moral 
claims that are ascribed to a legal person, there has to be 
a subject whose standpoint enables a reflexive value judg-
ment regarding the putative object of ‘an interest’ (Winter 
2010). The corpse is by definition unable to exercise such 
activity but the question adopts a different hue if this pre-
condition is imposed upon the subsequent existence of the 
public persona and some moldering bones. Winter pos-
its that for there to be a case for generating a moral claim, 
there has to be an entity for which this claim is of signifi-
cance. But could this also be the remaining public persona 
of a post-mortem entity to whom promises had been made 
in that entity’s ante-mortem phase?
As noted, people do feel a strong obligation with regard 
to those now dead. It may be argued that attributing claims 
to a posthumous public persona is formally identical to 
attributing moral claims to a vital person because posthu-
mous personae are similar in their discursive and textual 
ontology to living claimants. After all, moral discourse to 
a large extent deals with public personae. Our existence 
as a vital person consists of, for example, our abilities to 
learn, believe and to feel but, to be sure, also the way we 
are known and present ourselves in public. These facets 
comprise a dynamic, interdependent and organic unity that 
is called a person while alive. Our public persona during 
our lifetime as well as after our death subsists in speech, 
memory and information held in public media comparable 
33 Cf the ‘memorial’ into which your Facebook profile is converted 
after your demise.
to autobiographies. Indeed, after our demise it is exactly 
this discursive and textual ontology we presented dur-
ing our lifetime, that persists post-mortem. Some may 
argue that the public persona in its discursive character 
that survives death is similar to that of a living claimant. 
From this ontological interpretation of a living claimant 
as constituted by his information, it ensues that a right 
to informational privacy can be understood as a right to 
personal immunity from unknown, undesired or uninten-
tional changes in one’s identity. Why should this right not 
be declared of equal validity as to the digital double of the 
living claimant in his post-mortem phase? I suggest that 
life-transcending integrity is seriously harmed when the 
integrity of the informational identity of the post-mortem 
persona is transgressed. Floridi even calls violations of 
informational privacy a digital kidnapping, irrespective of 
whether it happens in a public or private context (Floridi 
2005); for that matter, I would add that the post-mortem 
and the ante-mortem phase can also be equated when such 
a violation occurs.
Recalling Dworkin’s distinction between detached and 
derivative value and keeping in mind that morality is not 
exhausted by the simple connection between claims and 
obligations (i.e. moral pluralism), then an action can be 
judged wrongful despite the absence of an active claimant. 
From a pluralistic morality standpoint, it can be upheld that 
there is no basis for attributing rights to the dead; however, 
the dead can still be wronged. The normativity of dead-
regarding actions should perhaps be found in a broader 
conception of morality and not merely in the failure to 
fulfil moral claims. As said, morality is not exhausted by 
the opposite arguments of claims and obligations. Prom-
ises and known desires can also provide moral reasons for 
action without those reasons being claims. Furthermore, we 
may have moral obligations to fulfill projects of the dead as 
they are justified by the warrant of vicarious interests (Win-
ter 2010).
Recent developments have widened the scope of the 
conceptual background of the legal subject in an attempt to 
determine the legal position of new actors such as robots, 
avatars and software agents. In the case of robots, the 
dilemma is whether these non-human agents can be held 
responsible for their legal actions or are the physical per-
sons behind, or chronologically before them, to be held 
responsible? An answer is sought in a reformulation of the 
criteria for legal agency, whether human or non-human. 
Teubner (Teubner 2007) uses the framework of social sys-
tems theory whereby he believes it can be argued that non-
human entities act as legal personalities. Entities can be 
attributed personhood by their environment under the mini-
mum requirement of double contingency or double antici-
pation. By this Teubner means that in both directions of 
social interaction, there is uncertainty, unpredictability. The 
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entity or person emanates a resistance to predictable behav-
ior while at the same time anticipating how others will 
‘read’ their behavior (Hildebrandt 2014). In this construal, 
it may also seem tenable that the law can attribute legal 
personality not only to humans but also to the source of 
mere flows of communications, such as exercised by 
(autonomous) software agents and also by digital personae 
that persist after the demise of their owner. It is interesting 
in this respect to note that novel adaptations in contract law 
have been carried out, whereby it is made possible for elec-
tronic agents to form a contract by the interaction of these 
electronic agents without the human principal being aware 
of it. This fits these electronic contracting partners with 
mental-juridical capacities like the intention to act, the 
intention to bind oneself legally etc. In Teubner’s account, 
furthermore, these non-human entities must have a capacity 
to deal with proto-meaning by which he (probably)34 means 
a capacity to ‘understand’ communication with the envi-
ronment without actually comprehending it. Are not the 
examples of gravestone technology and interactive pro-
grams that persist after your lifetime, to which this article 
alluded earlier, examples of the appearance a digital per-
sona may adopt as a vicarious entity that can deal with 
proto-meaning?
Taking this one step further, digital personae surviving 
in this form their ante-mortem appearance might be fitted 
by legal techniques with a capacity for legal action. How-
ever, in the near future it does not seem likely that this will 
lead to full personhood. It may be useful to introduce for 
now different gradations of legal personhood, depending on 
the level of interaction (and thus, the degree of double con-
tingency and capacity to deal with proto-meaning) that the 
digital persona displays. To offer a few suggestions of pos-
sible gradations in the case of post-mortem personae: mere 
interests, second-order rights or partial and full-fledged 
rights, concepts like demi-personalité juridique or situa-
tions where the bereaved can exercise moral rights of the 
decuius à travers le disparu.35 The capacity to exercise 
informational self-determination in order to support the 
privacy of the digital remains in the sense this article 
understands it, on the other hand, may be a step too far for 
now. Nevertheless, the arguments outlined above suggest 
that novel interpretations of the legal subject, taking the 
constitutive components of informational self-determina-
tion, viz. human dignity and the autonomy of the 
34 In the interpretation of (Koops et  al. 2010). In this definition, 
domesticated animals and adaptable software agents become candi-
dates for personae.
35 Rombach suggests a continuation of the human personality after 
its demise with respect to its inheritance rights and in matters of defa-
mation (Rombach 1963).
individual, as a starting point, can be of value in recogniz-
ing privacy claims of the digital remains of someone in the 
form of his subsisting digital persona. This concept of the 
post-mortem vicarious existence will need to be closely 
bound to its ante-mortem public persona. It will need a fol-
low-up article to further investigate how and to what extent 
independent digital personae, such as artificial life-forms, 
could be attributed a right to privacy in legal practice, 
including the question how such a right could actually be 
exercised and enforced.
Conclusion
Taking into account the ethical/moral discussion so far, 
the question may now be reposed, which are the legal con-
sequences of biological death for the possibility of trans-
posing the concept of informational self-determination, 
grounded in human dignity in the ante-mortem existence, 
to the post-mortem phase of a digital persona?
Most European privacy laws deny the possibility of 
the deceased holding privacy rights. This dominant view 
finds its origin in the above-discussed “problem-of-the-
subject” (Feinberg 1987). Death, being not only the ter-
minating boundary of one’s biological life, also means the 
end of the living subject with his long-range goals and 
hopes for his own achievement and personal enjoyment. 
This ante-mortem subject had an interest in protecting the 
information about these unique personal identity-deter-
mining character traits in order to flourish and realize his 
intrinsic human dignity. Without there being a subject 
to exercise this autonomous right, current European pri-
vacy laws hold that this right extinguishes with his death. 
It is the position of this article that this simple view no 
longer holds true in the light of the networked society 
developments.
The possibility is proposed that non-human entities in 
the shape of flows of communication can also adopt the 
appearance of subjects that can be attributed legal person-
ality (cf. Teubner 2007). It is argued that the same might 
hold true for the vicarious subsistence of active digital per-
sonae after the demise of their ante-mortem ‘owner’. Per-
haps, the owners of social network sites might enable the 
owner of the digital double during his ante-mortem phase, 
as it appears in his social network profile, to design a 
selection of his digital remains into an independent life 
form. However, the present legal system would most likely 
not be able to accommodate the right to privacy of such a 
life form as the continuation of the privacy rights of the 
ante-mortem owner. However, it cannot be ruled out that it 
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may start to come about somewhere in the coming 
decades.36
Still, it was also argued that it is not perhaps such an odd 
question to pose whether the assumption of personal sover-
eignty for the post-mortem presence of a human being, not 
only in the guise of flows of communication but also as the 
narrative of a person’s life, in which his death is only an 
event, may hold equal validity for shifting temporal bound-
aries beyond the spatial boundaries of the personal domain. 
From the point of view of the narrative technique, it can be 
argued that a self-conscious individual imposes a linguistic 
unity on the events that he has experienced in his autobiog-
raphy. In general, the individual attributes agential capacity 
to the personality that he deals with in his autobiography. 
These normative, informational activities thus permit a 
self-governing individual to constitute himself as a person 
and articulate his life stories in autobiographical narratives. 
Social network profiles, which in various forms can subsist 
after death, can very well serve the same goal. Indeed, 
autobiographies are in many ways similar to the public per-
sonae as they are composed in the form of social network 
profiles. Assuming that the hypothesis that posthumous 
personae are similar in their discursive and textual ontolo-
gies to living claimants (Winter 2010) is correct, it is a rea-
sonable proposition to argue that attributing claims to a 
posthumous public persona is identical to attributing moral 
claims to a vital person. Or, as Kant argued, the bona fama 
defuncti deserves protection because it is a general human 
right.37
As has been noted, it might seem that the absence of will 
in the post-mortem persona would preclude the possibility 
of granting it rights because it is incapable of exercising 
sovereignty (Wenar 2011). However, ordinarily, we would 
not doubt that the intrinsic value of human dignity, under-
pinning human rights, as well as unwaivable rights, such as 
the right not to be enslaved are indivisible parts of the legal 
personality of mankind. Indeed, it has been argued that the 
personality right of the deceased or at least his personhood 
continues to exist as long as the interest of the deceased 
makes this necessary (den Hartogh 2010). Today the abun-
dance of social network profiles suggests privacy should be 
framed more as a common good while at the same time the 
36 Brownsword expects that engaging in a speculative discussion on 
this topic at the turn of the next Millennium or the Millennium after 
that, will have a little more “practical purchase” (Brownsword 2008). 
Cf, however, the earlier mentioned social network ETER9 and the 
Companions project (Wilks 2015). The technical basis for this project 
was, as a matter of fact, ‘machine learning’.
37 Feinberg posits convincingly that the interest one has in a good 
reputation is the best example of the self-regarding category also 
when one is no longer in a position to be injured, wronged or harmed 
by it (Feinberg 1987).
normative underpinnings of the value of privacy are shared 
among members of society (Regan 2015). This conception 
of privacy mutatis mutandis might be said to apply to the 
post-mortem privacy of socially constructed selves in a net-
worked society.
These strong human rights lay a claim on others to 
respect your sovereignty merely because you have these 
rights as human being and they are good for you. In sum, if 
the premise holds, that (1) the discursive and textual human 
ontology of a living claimant is characterized by being 
composed of strands of information and (2) that this tenet 
would warrant bestowing human beings with human rights 
[in contrast to non-human beings (Miller 2015)], then, if 
(3) the post-mortem’s existence ontology is likewise char-
acterized by strands of information, the conclusion may 
be drawn that the ontology of the post-mortem existence 
also warrants granting this existence human rights such as 
human rights grounded in human dignity. Thus this onto-
logical approach helps in subsequently providing a basis 
for recognizing a right to privacy for post-mortem perso-
nae. This, in turn, ties in nicely with the observation that 
respect for the dead is generally considered to be an ethical 
obligation.
Furthermore, if in the future a positive effort by social 
network providers,38 for example, is made to construct 
applications that may allow the ante-mortem person to 
maintain, shape and design his identity as informational 
agent (Floridi 2005), this can be construed as putting into 
practice the Kantian view of the cultivation of moral 
agency, of moral will yielding authentic freedom and 
responsibility. Thus, it can be argued that the post-mortem 
person could acquire a right to privacy in a sense and man-
ner, comparable to the way by which the concept of infor-
mational self-determination endows the ante-mortem per-
sonality with a right to privacy.
This article has given an indication of a few legal solu-
tions that are directed towards overcoming the seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle to endowing deceased persons 
with a right to privacy due to the absence of legal subjec-
tivity. While it is often assumed that the lack of this quality 
makes it impossible to ascribe the legal possibility of exer-
cising control over its informational presence to the post-
mortem person’s digital subsistence, the argument devel-
oped in this paper presents at least plausible arguments 
that evolving legal doctrine in conjunction with novel 
perspectives on personality may also accommodate the 
concept of informational self-determination as a basis for 
providing a continued warranty for human dignity, for the 
digital remains of a person after the demise of his bodily 
38 So far, there have only been a few start-ups, such as ETER9.
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presence, which increasingly may take the form of an inter-
active public persona. Thus, post-mortem privacy, albeit at 
first limited to the nature of for example a demi-personalité 
juridique, is a plausible perspective.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give 
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a 
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were 
made.
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